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as a Talisman for Analysis
by Mack A. Player*
I. MOTIVATION AND ITS PROOF: THE McDonnell Douglas MODEL
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 prohibits employers, labor
organizations, and employment agencies from discriminating in employ-
ment decisions because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
of the employee or applicant. The Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967s (ADEA) similarly prohibits discrimination because of age
against employees and applicants between the ages of forty to seventy.'
* Professor of Law, University of Georgia. Drury College (A.B., 1963); University of Mis-
souri (J.D., 1965); George Washington University (LL.M., 1972). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982). The provision relevant to this discussion is
found at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982), which reads:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. § 2000e-2(a). See also, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(b) to (d) (1982), which contain similar lan-
guage applicable to labor organizations, employment agencies, and labor-management ap-
prenticeship committees.
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982).
3. Id. § 623.
855
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Violations of these statutes can be established without regard to the de-
fendant's motivation.4 If the plaintiff can show that a particular employ-
ment practice has an adverse impact upon the protected class of persons
of which the plaintiff is a member, the burden is shifted to the defendant
to prove that the challenged practice is a 'business necessity. '" Proof of
4. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The EEOC and the weight of
authority have held that the impact analysis developed by the Court in Griggs for Title VII
is applicable to the ADEA. See 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(d) (1982); EEOC v. Borden's, Inc., 724
F.2d 1390, 1394 (9th Cir. 1984); Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686, 690
(8th Cir. 1983); Allison v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 680 F.2d 1318, 1321-22 (11th Cir.
1982); Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1032 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945
(1981). For a critique, see Player, Title VII Impact Analysis Applied to the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act: Is A Transplant Appropriate?, 14 U. ToLEDo L REv. 1261
(1983).
5. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) addressed the impact of two differ-
ent selection criteria: a high school diploma requirement and a passing score on a nation-
ally developed employment test. The Court found the adverse impact of the diploma re-
quirement by using census data that showed 34 % of the white males in the state of North
Carolina had high school diplomas, compared to only 12% of the black males. Id. at 430 n.6.
The impact of the objective test was found by accepting an EEOC study of a similar test at
an unnamed time and location which indicated that 58% of the whites received a passing
score compared to a success rate for blacks of only 6%. Id. In Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
U.S. 321 (1977), the Court found adverse impact on women of a minimal height and weight
requirement from statistical data indicating that over 41% of the female population of the
United States would not qualify, compared to an exclusion rate for potential male appli-
cants of only 1%. 401 U.S. at 329-30. Both Griggs and Dothard used potential applicant
pool statistical data to establish the impact of the job qualification. Cf. New York City
Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 583-87 (1979), which rejected such data. The Court in
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982), found adverse impact by using 'applicant flow'
data. Minority applicants were disqualified from further consideration in the selection pro-
cess at a higher rate than nonminority applicants.
6. The seminal case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), adopted the con-
cept of 'business necessity.' It did not, however, define its meaning. The Court stated: "If
an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to
job performance, the practice is prohibited." Id. at 431. Later in the opinion, the Court
said: "Congress has placed on the employer the burden of showing that any given require-
ment must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question." Id. at 432. In
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), the Court clarified the concept somewhat. The
concept of 'lesser discriminatory alternatives' was considered to be an element of 'business
necessity' in that a criterium would not be 'necessary' if alternative methods of selection
were available. The Court in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975), held
that selection tests having an adverse impact must be validated according to professionally
developed standards. General conclusions about work relatedness would not suffice to carry
defendant's burden. Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248-52 (1976), in which strict
valuation was not required. In New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979),
however, the Court suggested a significantly lighter burden. A rule barring methadone users
would be justified if 'job related,' and it would be 'job related' if "those [business] goals are
significantly served by-even if they do not require--[the rule]." Id. at 587 n.31. The bur-
den upon a defendant is a burden of persuasion, to convince the court of the existence of
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good faith or the lack of improper motivation alone does not relieve the
defendant of liability." If the defendant fails to prove the 'necessity' of
the practice having the adverse impact on the protected class, the plain-
tiff will prevail.$
Motive, however, is always relevant in employment discrimination
cases.' If the plaintiff can establish discriminatory treatment 'because' of
the statutorily proscribed criteria, he will prevail. In the absence of direct
evidence of motivation 0 there are two major methods by which a plaintiff
can prove illegal motivation. Both rely on evidentiary inferences. The first
method by which an inference of illegal motivation can be created is
through statistical data. If the plaintiff can show a starkly disproportion-
ate number of women or minorities in the work force or any particular
segment thereof, a comparison that would not be the product of chance,
the burden will shift to the defendant to come forward with a creditable,
lawful explanation for the statistical disparity." Absence of an explana-
tion leaves unrefuted the inference that illegal considerations motivated
the selection process. At this stage the defendant can avoid liability only
the 'business necessity.' See Walker v. Jefferson County Home, 726 F.2d 1554, 1558 (11th
Cir. 1984); Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, 657 F.2d 750, 752 n.2 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 967 (1982); Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1275 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1021 (1982).
7. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247 (1976); Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S.
424, 432 (1971). Of course, if the plaintiff can establish that criteria are used for illegal
purposes this will establish a violation of the Act even if the criteria are job related. See
New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 436 (1975). See generally General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsyl-
vania, 458 U.S. 375, 378-82 (1982), which discusses the difference between impact and moti-
vation in the context of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
8. See supra note 6.
9. See County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981); New York City Transit
Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
10. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Circuit Court of St. Louis County, 729 F.2d 541 (8th Cir. 1984)
(testimony that employer stated "This court will never run so long as there are women in
charge," is direct evidence of illegal motivation in a demotion and transfer of a female em-
ployee Id. at 546); Capaci v. Katz & Besthoff, Inc., 711 F.2d 647, 659 (5th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1709 (1984) (advertisement seeking males for management trainees and
females for clericals directly indicates sex motivation); Hodgson v. First Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 455 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1972) (notation on interview that applicant was "too old" is
direct evidence of age motivation Id. at 823).
11. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 337-43 (1977);
Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); Lilly v. Harris-Teeter Super-
market, 720 U.S. 326, 336 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2154 (1984); Payne v.
Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 673 F.2d 798, 817 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1038
(1982); Gay v. Waiters' & Dairy Lunchmen's Union No. 30, 694 F.2d 531, 553 (9th Cir.
1982); Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA), 1690, 1708-13 (D.N.M.
1977), aff'd, 639 F.2d 600 (10th Cir. 1980). See generally 2 H. EGLrr, AGE DISCRIMINATON §
17.64 (1983).
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by showing that notwithstanding the -per-vasive illegal 4motivation,: the
particular applicant would not have ben selected.1"
In a situation involving individual, disparate treatment, the court in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green1 3 held that a plaintiff can establish an
initial inference of illegal motivation by proving the existence of six objec-
tive elements: 4  (I) plaintiff belongs to a class protected by Title VII;15
12. See International Bdh. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 357-62 (1977);
Castenda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); King v. Trans World Airways, 738 F.2d 255 (8th
Cir. 1984); Lee v. Russell County Bd. of Educ., 684 F.2d 769, 774 (11th Cir. 1982); Muntin v.
California Parks & Rec. Dep't, 671 F.2d 360, 363 (9th Cir. 1982). Cf. NLRB v. Transporta-
tion Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 400-01 (1983). Under Board procedures, once the
general counsel established that illegal motivation was present, the employer was required
to prove that the same decision would have been made even absent the illegal motivation.
The Court agreed that this did not improperly shift the burden of proving motivation from
the general counsel to the respondent.
13. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
14. Id. at 802. The Court actually listed four elements:
(i) plaintiff belongs to a racial minority; (ii) plaintiff applied and was qualified for
a job which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) despite plaintiff's qualifica-
tion, he was rejected, (iv) after plaintiff's rejection, the position remained open
and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications.
Id. Under factor (ii), the Court combined three distinct factual elements: (a) application,
(b) qualification of plaintiff, and (c) vacancy.
The McDonnell Douglas model has been adapted for use in ADEA disparate treatment
cases. See Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Corp., 696 F.2d 1176, 1179-80 (6th Cir. 1983); Anderson v.
Savage Laboratories, Inc., 675 F.2d 1221 (11th Cir. 1982); Cuddy v. Carmen, 694 F.2d 853,
854 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 531-32 (9th Cir. 1981); Geller v.
Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1034-35 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981); Smithers
v. Bailar, 629 F.2d 892, 895 (3d Cir. 1980); McCorstin v. United States Steel Corp., 621 F.2d
749, 752 (5th Cir. 1980); Smith v. Flax, 618 F.2d 1062 (4th Cir. 1980); Loeb v. Textron, Inc.,
600 F.2d 1003, 1013-14 (1st Cir. 1979); Cova v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Inc., 574 F.2d 958,
960 (8th Cir. 1978). Although the precise formulation varies from circuit to circuit the best
restatement requires a plaintiff to show that he or she is within the protected age group,
met applicable job qualifications, sought the job and was not hired (or was discharged), and
that a person substantially younger than the plaintiff was hired or retained. See Douglas,
656 F.2d at 531-32; Cuddy, 694 F.2d at 854. The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits require the
plaintiff's proof to include a showing that the person favored over the plaintiff was not only
substantially younger than the plaintiff but was also under the age of 40. See Allison v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 680 F.2d 1318, 1320 (11th Cir. 1982); Williams v. General Motors
Corp., 656 F.2d 120, 122 n.3 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982). See also
Player, Proof of Disparate Treatment Under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act: Variations on a Title VII Theme, 17 G& L. Rav. 621, 636-44 (1983).
Courts have interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) to reach racial discrimination in employ-
ment (see, e.g., General Bldg. Contractors As'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982)), and
have used the McDonnell-Douglas standards to address individual disparate treatment. See
Gay v. Waiters' & Dairy Lunchmen's Union Local No. 30, 694 F.2d 531, 539 (9th Cir. 1982).
15. White males are protected by Title VII against race and sex discrimination. See Mc-
Donald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976). It might be argued that if
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(2) defendant had a vacancy and was seeking applicants;' (3) plaintiff
has the qualifications to perform the job;1 7 (4) plaintiff applied; s (5)
plaintiff was not hired;9 and (6) defendant continued to seek
the person making the employment decision is of the same race and gender as the plaintiff
this refutes any inference of illegal discrimination drawn solely from the rejection of an
applicant. The courts, however, have rejected a 'governing majority' concept whereby an
inference of motivation necessarily is refuted by showing that the decisionmaker who re-
jected a minority applicant was also a minority person. See Bell v. Bolger, 708 F.2d 1312,
1315 n.3 (9th Cir. 1983). See also Castenda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499-500 (1977). An
inference of race or sex discrimination against nonminority persons may be created by a
showing that the person making the employment decision was of a different race or gender,
Chaline v. KCOH, Inc., 693 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1982); Whiting v. Jackson State Univ., 616
F.2d 116, 123-24 (5th Cir. 1980), or that there are 'special circumstances,' such as an affirma-
tive action plan, from which it can be inferred that the plaintiff was rejected because he was
a white male. See Rucker v. Higher Educ. Aids Bd., 669 F.2d 1179 (7th Cir. 1982); Parker v.
Baltimore & O.R.R., 652 F.2d 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Daye v. Harris, 655 F.2d 258 (D.C. Cir.
1981). See also Martinez v. El Paso County, 710 F.2d 1102, 1104 (5th Cir. 1983), in which
the court held that a white male had established a prima facie case simply by showing that
he was a member of a 'protected class.'
Regardless of whether a person of a race or sex similar to the decisionmaker can establish
a prima facie case simply by showing a rejection, it is clear that if the decisionmaker was
unaware of the plaintiff's age, race, or sex, this will refute an inference of illegal motivation.
See Miller v. Mercy Hosp., 720 F.2d 357, 363-68 (4th Cir. 1983); Parcinski v. Outlet Co., 673
F.2d 34, 36-37 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1103 (1983).
16. See Davis v. Payless Cashways, 661 F.2d 1022, 1025-26 (5th Cir. 1981); Chavez v.
Tempe Union High School Dist., 565 F.2d 1087, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 1977).
17. To establish that a plaintiff is 'qualified,' she need only show that she possesses the
posted job qualifications, or otherwise has been performing the job satisfactorily. See EEOC
v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d 633, 637 (4th Cir. 1983); Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., 697 F.2d 810, 813-14 (8th Cir. 1983); EEOC v. Brown & Root, Inc., 688 F.2d 338, 340
(5th Cir. 1982); Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1253 (8th Cir. 1981); Aikens v.
United States Postal Serv., 665 F.2d 1057, 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 460
U.S. 711 (1983). Comparative superiority of the person who secured the job or was retained
in the plaintiff's place is a 'legitimate nondiscriminatory reason' to be established by the
defendant; it is not a part of the plaintiffs prima facie case. See Texas Dep't of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258-59 (1981). Cf. Cuthbertson v. Biggers Bros., Inc., 702
F.2d 454, 465 (4th Cir. 1983); Cartagena v. Secretary of Navy, 618 F.2d 130, 133 (1st Cir.
1980); Kephart v. Institute of Gas Technology, 630 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 959 (1981), which suggest that unless a plaintiff can establish her relative superior-
ity she will have failed to establish a prima facie case.
18. See Reilly v. Friedman's Express, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 618, 624 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (an
informal inquiry was not an application and, thus, no prima facie case was made). In EEOC
v. F & D Distrib., Inc., 728 F.2d 1281 (10th Cir. 1984), plaintiff inquired about an advertised
job vacancy. An employee, who had the appearance of being in charge of the store, told the
female plaintiff that the job was for men as it required some lifting. Plaintiff left without
filling out a formal application or pursuing the matter with the employee's superiors. The
court held that plaintiff failed to prove her case. Id. at 1283. If the issue is discriminatory
discharge plaintiff need not prove 'application.'
19. If the issue is discriminatory discharge, a plaintiff needs to prove that she was dis-
charged. See Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir. 1983), in which the
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applicants.2 0
Although the McDonnell Douglas test arose in a discriminatory hiring
case," with appropriate modifications it has been applied when the issue
was discriminatory discharge.22 In order to establish an inference of illegal
motivation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he is a member of a pro-
tected class, that he was performing satisfactory work prior to the dis-
charge, and that the employer either sought to fill the vacancy or used
nonminority persons to perform the work previously assigned to the
plaintiff.23
court held that since plaintiff had voluntarily resigned she had failed to establish a prima
ficie case. If an employer deliberately makes an employee's working conditions intolerable,
however, a resignation may be deemed to be a constructive discharge. See Meyer v. Brown
& Root Constr. Co., 661 F.2d 369, 372 (6th Cir. 1981).
20. This element is not uniformly required. If a nonminority person was simultaneously
hired with the rejection of the plaintiff, or in a discharge case, if the minority person was
discharged while a white employee was retained, this will establish a prima facie case with-
out a showing that the employer searched for applicants. See Hagans v. Andrus, 651 F.2d
622 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 859 (1981). See also United States Postal Serv. v.
Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983) (denial of promotion to black but granted to white established a
prima facie case); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (dis-
charge of female while retaining male). Both cases presupposed a prima facie case without
this final element. See also Peters v. Jefferson Chem. Co., 516 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1975), in
which a prima facie case was established even though the rejection of a minority applicant
was not followed by any further searching, apparently because the employer believed he
would continue to receive minority applicants.
The grant of the position to someone of the same race or sex might refute a prima facie
showing. See Jones v. Western Geophysical Co. of Am., 669 F.2d 280, 284 (5th Cir. 1982);
Freeman v. Lewis, 675 F.2d 398, 400 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Cf. Keys v. Lutheran Family & Chil-
dren's Servs., 668 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1981). See also Howard v. Roadway Express, Inc., 726
F.2d 1529, 1534 (11th Cir. 1984), holding that the hiring of a black person to the vacancy
did not destroy the prima facie case of a black applicant, when plaintiffs challenge was to a
practice to which only members of his race were subjected. Similarly, the hiring of a woman
to the position does not refute the prima facie showing of a black plaintiff. DeLesstine v.
Fort Wayne Hosp., 682 F.2d 130 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982).
21. Because a promotion or transfer is similar to a hiring, similar standards have been
used to determine the elements of a prima facie case. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. v.
Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983). Some courts have suggested, however, that for entry into
nonroutine jobs, the McDonnell Douglas formula for a prima facie case is not appropriate.
To raise an inference of improper motivation the plaintiff needs to show more than bare
minimal paper qualifications. See Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d 85, 93-94 (2d Cir. 1984)
(significant portion of department, referrants, or other scholars hold favorable view of plain-
tiff's promotion); Mason- v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank, 704 F.2d 361, 366 (7th Cir. 1983)
(high level job requires a plaintiff to show ability superior to the person selected).
22. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
23. See Lee v. Russell County Bd. of Educ., 684 F.2d 769, 773 (11th Cir. 1982); Johnson
v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1253 (8th Cir. 1981); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231,
1239 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. *denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978).
In disciplinary discharge situations one court has articulated a more precise standard for
creating a prima facie case. A plaintiff must prove that he is a member of a protected class,
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Proof of these elements establishes a prima facie case of illegal motiva-
tion. These objective elements create "an inference of discrimination...
because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely
than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors."3' 4 This
showing, however, is not conclusive proof of discriminatory motive. The
Court in McDonnell Douglas held that if a plaintiff establishes these ob-
jective elements, thus creating an inference of illegal motivation, "the
burden must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for the employee's rejection."25 Failure of the defen-
dant to 'articulate' a 'reason' that is 'legitimate' and 'nondiscriminatory'
will result in a judgment, as a matter of law, for the plaintiff." This is
because when "all legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant have been
eliminated [or none articulated] .. . it is more likely than not the em-
ployer, whom we generally assume acts only with some reason, based his
decision on an impermissible consideration."
2 7
The Court in McDonnell Douglas gave no guidance concerning what it
meant by "burden to articulate reason.' 28 The term 'articulate' suggests
that defendant's obligations could have been satisfied simply by pleading
a reason or stating a reason in argument of counsel." The term 'burden'
on the other hand implies a duty to convince the fact finder that the
employer was motivated by the proffered reason.'s After considerable
that there is a company policy concerning the activity for which the plaintiff was disci-
plined, that employees of a different class were given the benefit of a lenient company prac-
tice or not held to compliance with a strict company policy, and that the plaintiff was disci-
plined either without the application of a lenient policy or in conformity with the strict one.
EEOC v. Brown & Root, Inc., 688 F.2d 338, 340 (5th Cir. 1982).
24. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
25. 411 U.S. at 802.
26. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). Prior to
Burdine there was some question concerning whether the prima facie case merely allowed a
finding on behalf of the plaintiff, or whether, in the absence of contradicting evidence, a
prima facie case required a finding for the plaintiff. See, e.g., Olson v. Philco-Ford, 531 F.2d
474 (10th Cir. 1976). See also Mendez, Presumptions of Discriminatory Motive in Title VII
Disparate Treatment Cases, 32 STAN. L. Rav. 1129, 1149-50 (1980). The decision in Burdine
clearly means, however, that the inference of discrimination created by a prima facie case is
not merely a 'permissible' inference that allows the inference of the fact in issue, but is a
'rebuttable presumption' that requires a finding in favor of the party who has the benefit of
the presumed fact. Cf. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358-
60 nn. 4-45. See generally 9 J. WIGMORE, EVmENCE § 2494 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1981).
27. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
28. The 'burden to articulate reasons' in evidentiary terminology is meaningless. The
defendant's obligation must be defined in terms of evidentiary burdens. See generally Men-
dez, supra note 26.
29. WEesTza's THmw NEw INT'L DicriONARY 124 (Unabridged, 1967) defines 'articulate'
as "to utter distinctly." Id.
30. 'Burden' has two evidentiary meanings. The first is producing evidence of a particu-
1985]
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confusion, 31 the Court eventually concluded that the 'burden to articu-
late' did not impose on the defendant a burden of persuasion on the issue
of motivation;32 instead, the 'burden to articulate' imposed an evidentiary
obligation on the defendant that was not satisfied by merely pleading a
reason or providing a reason in an argument.33 Defendant was required to
'come forward' with admissible evidence "legally sufficient to justify a
judgment for the defendant."' 4 Even this holding contains considerable
ambiguity. It can be suggested that a defendant meets its burden by
presenting legally sufficient evidence that tends to establish the factual
existence of the reason, but a defendant has no duty to convince the fact
finder that the reason articulated actually exists.35 The defendant, how-
ever, must meet and refute the inference of illegal motivation created by
a plaintiffs prima facie showing. To do this, the defendant must establish
to the satisfaction of the fact finder that the articulated reason (to be
distinguished from motive) actually exists.36 Only by concluding that the
lar fact in issue, often defined as a 'burden of coming forward with evidence.' The second is
'burden of persuasion,' an obligation to convince the fact finder that a relevant fact exists.
This 'burden of proof' is often called a 'risk of non-persuasion.' See MCCORMICK ON EVI-
DENCE § 336 (2d ed. 1972); 9 J. WIGMoIW, EVIDENCE § 2487 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1981).
31. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
32. Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 27-29 (1978).
33. "An articulation not admitted into evidence will not suffice. Thus the defendant can-
not meet its burden merely through an answer to the complaint or by argument of counsel."
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.9 (1981). "Defendant's
explanation of its legitimate reasons must be clear and reasonably specific." Id. at 258.
34. Id. at 255. See also White v. Vathally, 732 F.2d 1037, 1042 (1st Cir. 1984) (averments
of good faith and a passing reference to a defect was not the articulation of a reasonably
specific reason); Baylor v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 733 F.2d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir. 1984)
(burden of articulating reason was not met by using transcript of hearing made after the
decision to discharge had been made); Lewis v. Smith, 731 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1984); Lee v.
Conecuh County Bd. of Educ., 634 F.2d 959, 963 (5th Cir. 1981).
35. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), presents an un-
certain analysis of the extent of a defendant's burden. Some of the Court's language superfi-
cially suggests that a defendant will satisfy its burden simply by presenting evidence that
would allow a fact finder to conclude that the reason exists, and that the defendant is under
no further burden to convince the fact finder that the reason exists. A number of decisions
follow the implications of Burdine, and hold specifically that the defendant carries its bur-
den even if the fact finder does not believe that the articulated reasons exist. Thus, once the
defendant presents evidence of the existence of a reason, if the plaintiff cannot carry the
ultimate burden of persuading the fact finder of illegal motive, the defendant will prevail.
See Brooks v. Ashtubula County Welfare Dep't, 717 F.2d 263 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 1687 (1984); Danzl v. North St. Paul-Maplewood-Oakdale Ind. School Dist. No.
622, 663 F.2d 65, 66-67 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc); Sanchez v. Texas Comm. on Alcoholism,
660 F.2d 658, 662 (5th Cir. 1981); St. Peters v. Secretary of the Army, 659 F.2d 1133, 1137-
38 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 196 (1982).
36. See Player, The Evidentiary Nature of Defendant's Burden in Title VII Disparate
Treatment Cases, 49 Mo. L. REv. 17 (1984). To create an inference of illegal motivation, a
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defendant's proffered reason exists, or that the defendant believed it ex-
isted, can a trial court infer that the reason, rather than the illegal factor,
motivated the particular employment action.37
If the defendant carries its burden of articulating a legitimate nondis-
criminatory reason, it will be entitled to a judgment unless the plaintiff
can present additional evidence of illegal motivation. s The plaintiff must
plaintiff must establish the factual existence of objective elements from which the inference
of illegal motive can be deduced. Similarly, since a defendant must create an inference of
legal motive, it should be necessary for the defendant to establish the objective facts from
which such motivation can be inferred. If the fact finder does not believe that the reason
articulated actually exists, or that the defendant believed that it existed (DeAnda v. St.
Joseph Hosp., 671 F.2d 850, 854 (1982)), there is no premise from which the fact finder can
infer that the articulated reason, rather than proscribed criteria, motivated the employment
decision. Thus, the plaintiff's prima facie showing of illegal motivation has not been met and
refuted by a legally sufficient counter-inference. See Lewis v. Smith, 731 F.2d 1535 (11th
Cir. 1984); Sylvester v. Callon Energy Serv., Inc., 724 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1984); Thorne v.
City of El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1984); Harris v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 712
F.2d 1377 (11th Cir. 1983); Lamphear v. Propkop, 703 F.2d 1311 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Mohan-
ned v. Callaway, 698 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1983).
In analyzing sex discrimination in pay under the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)
(1982), the Court has held that once unequal pay for 'equal work' has been established the
burden is upon the employer to establish that the pay distinction is justified by a 'factor
other than sex.' The plaintiff has no burden to prove or present evidence of sex motivation.
See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974). That 'factor' must be proven to
exist and to be sex neutral. Id., see also Hodgson v. Behrens Drug Co., 475 F.2d 1041 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 822 (1973). There is a need to interpret Title VII and the Equal
Pay Act in a consistent manner. See City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Man-
hart, 435 U.S. 702, 711-14 (1978). It is advisable, therefore, to place on a defendant a similar
burden of establishing the existence and legitimacy of the reason that it articulates. See
Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 875 (9th Cir. 1982); Strecker v. Grand Forks
County Social Serv. Bd., 640 F.2d 96, 100 (8th Cir. 1981).
37. This can be accomplished by shifting the burdens of coming forward with the evi-
dence. A defendant satisfies its immediate burden of coming forward by producing legally
admissible evidence of the reason's objective existence. This, in turn, shifts to a plaintiff the
burden of coming forward on the issue of the existence or nonexistence of the reason. If the
plaintiff presents no evidence to suggest that the reason articulated by the defendant does
not exist, the court must find that the reason exists. If the plaintiff has failed to place this
fact in issue, judgment must be for the defendant. If, however, the plaintiff presents legally
admissible evidence that the reason did not exist, that factual issue is joined, and the court
must decide whether the articulated reason exists. Once the issue of the reason's existence is
joined, the defendant should carry the risk of persuading the fact finder of its existence.
Only if that burden is met by the defendant, must the plaintiff carry the ultimate burden of
proving that the illegal factor, not the articulated reason, motivated the employer. See
Player, supra note 36, at 31-38.
38. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 (1981); Steckl v.
Motorola, Inc., 703 F.2d 392, 393 (9th Cir. 1983). The Court in Burdine rejected Professor
Morgan's theory that a presumption flowing from a prima facie case shifted to the defen-
dant a risk of nonpersuasion on the fact presumed. See E. MoPGso, SoME PROBLEMS OF
PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LIGATION 80-81 (1956); 9 WIGMORF, Evi-
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be accorded a fair opportunity to show that the employer's stated reason
for the plaintiff's rejection was in fact pretext.3 9 The burden that reshifts
to the plaintiff when the defendant establishes reasons is a burden to pre-
sent evidence, beyond the prima facie showing, that tends to establish the
defendant's improper motivation. 0 The Court in McDonnell Douglas in-
dicated that this additional evidence of illegal motivation might consist of
proof that in the past the articulated reasons have not been uniformly
applied, that the defendant has expressed specific prejudice against plain-
tiff's class, or that the defendant's general employment patterns show a
discriminatory mind-set."' At this point, therefore, the defendant's articu-
lation of a legitimate reason places on the plaintiff an immediate burden
to present evidence on the issue of motivation. The prima facie case alone
is no longer sufficient to support a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. In
addition, the defendant's articulation places on the plaintiff the ultimate
risk of nonpersuasion. A plaintiff not only must present evidence of illegal
motivation, but must convince the trial court by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant was motivated by factors made illegal by Ti-
tle VII.42
DENCE § 2493 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1981).
39. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
40. Although rejecting Morgan's theory that a defendant presented with a prima facie
case must carry a burden of persuasion on the issue of motivation, the Court did not fully
adopt the Thayer 'bursting bubble' view that, once evidence is presented that challenges the
prima facie case, the evidentiary value of the prima facie case is destroyed. See J. THAYERA
PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT COMMON LAW 346 (1898). The Court in Texas Dep't
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) stated that in evaluating whether a
plaintiff had persuaded the fact finder of the employer's illegal motivation, the fact finder
should "consider evidence previously introduced to establish the prima facie case." Id. at
255 n.10. But see United States Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714-15 (1983), sug-
gesting that once a legitimate reason is articulated by the defendant the prima facie showing
drops from the case and need not be considered by the fact finder.
41. 411 U.S. at 804-05. See O'Brien v. Sky Chefs, 670 F.2d 864, 868-70 (9th Cir. 1982);
Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 673 F.2d 798, 819-26 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1038 (1982); Hagans v. Andrus, 651 F.2d 622, 624-26 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 859
(1981); Davis v. Califano, 613 F.2d 957, 962-63 (D.C. Cir. 1979), illustrating use of statistics
to show motivation. For an example of lack of uniformity in imposing the rules, see McDon-
ald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278-85 (1976); Muldrew v. Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., 728 F.2d 989, 991-92 (8th Cir. 1984); Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459, 463-
68 (9th Cir. 1983). For pretext established from a broad pattern of treatment, see Harris v.
Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 712 F.2d 1377, 1381-83 (11th Cir. 1983); Lowry v. Whitaker Cable
Corp., 348 F. Supp. 202, 209-16 (W.D. Mo. 1972), aff'd, 472 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1973).
42. A formalistic 'three-step minuet' is possible, with a plaintiff making a prima facie
case, followed by a defendant's presentation of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons, which
in turn is followed by the plaintiff showing pretext. The trial court, however, controls the
order of proof. FED. R. EvaD. 611. Thus, a court could require the plaintiff to present all of
its evidence, at one time, while reserving for rebuttal only direct refutation of the plaintiff's
evidence. See Holden v. Comm'n Against Discrimination, 671 F.2d 30, 36-38 (1st Cir.), cert.
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The focal point in the three-step minuet of disparate treatment analy-
sis is whether the defendant has carried its burden of establishing the
existence of a 'legitimate nondiscriminatory' reason. Should the defen-
dant fail to carry its burden, the plaintiff's prima facie showing is unre-
futed and the plaintiff as a matter of law must prevail. There is no need
to proceed to the third step of the plaintiff proving illegal motivation. If
the defendant presents a legitimate reason, the issue will then proceed to
a new level specifically addressing the evidence of motivation.'"
Because 'legitimate' and 'nondiscriminatory' are legal norms, the reso-
lution of whether a reason is legitimate and nondiscriminatory is a ques-
tion of law." The focus of this Article is the proper definition of these
norms.
II. LEGITIMAcY DEFINED: THE BROAD PARAMETERS
A. Introduction: The Premise
The analytical basis of the decision in McDonnell Douglas, which was
reaffirmed by the Court in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters'5 and
United States Postal Service v. Aikens," is that the ultimate issue in a
disparate treatment case is motivation, which is, and should be, ad-
dressed by the use of the inferences defined by the Court in McDonnell
Douglas. A plaintiff's prima facie case raises an inference of illegal moti-
vation that must be placed in issue by the defendant. Thus, the defen-
dant's burden is to establish facts from which a fact finder could infer
that it was the articulated reason, rather than illegal factors, which moti-
vated the defendant's treatment of the plaintiff. The defendant's failure
to carry its evidentiary burden of creating a permissible inference of legal
motivation will result in a judgment for the plaintiff. At this point, there
is no need for the plaintiff to present additional evidence that the articu-
denied, 459 U.S. 843 (1982); Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 552 F.2d 1277, 1282-84 (7th
Cir. 1977); Sime v. Trustees of California State Univ. & Colleges, 526 F.2d 1112 (9th Cir.
1975). In Title VII, the three-step approach is useful for analytical purposes. In Age Act
cases and suits arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976), it is indispensable. Both of those
statutes allow for trial by jury. The three steps need to be set forth in a jury instruction,
with the jury, rather than the court, making the final factual resolution. Furthermore, the
court may be required to decide, as a matter of law, whether the articulated reason is legally
sufficient to support a verdict in favor of the defendant.
43. United States Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983).
44. See Harris v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 712 F.2d 1377, 1381-82 (11th Cir. 1983);
Paxton v. Union Nat'l Bank, 688 F.2d 552, 558-59 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1083 (1983).
45. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
46. 460 U.S. 711 (1983).
19851 865
HeinOnline  -- 36 Mercer L. Rev. 865 1984-1985
MERCER LAW REVIEW
lated reason is pretext. It is this concept of the defendant's burden that
should define the term 'legitimate.' If the reason is capable of supporting
an inference that it motivated the defendant's treatment of the plaintiff,
the reason is 'legitimate.' If the reason, however, is incapable of support-
ing an inference of legal motivation, the reason lacks legitimacy.
From the holdings and implications of the Court's decisions we can be
relatively certain of legitimacy's two parameters. On one hand, to be le-
gitimate, a reason need not be absolutely 'necessary' to the defendant's
safe and efficient operation. A rational reason, far short of 'necessary,'
would permit a fact finder to infer that the rational reason motivated the'
action. On the other hand, to be legitimate, a reason must at least be
legal. An illegal reason cannot carry a permissible inference of legal moti-
vation. Between these relatively clear extremes of legality and necessity
lies the uncertainty. Application of the premise that a reason is legitimate
only if it is capable of supporting an inference of legal motivation would
result in a relatively clear definition of the term, a definition that would
lie midway between the extremes of legality and necessity. It would result
in 'legitimacy' being defined as 'business rationality.' A reason will be 'le-
gitimate' only if it has a rational relationship to bona fide business con-
cerns. Reasons that are arbitrary or irrational cannot support an infer-
ence that arbitrariness or irrationality, rather than proscribed factors,
motivated the defendant, and absent the capacity of an articulated reason
to support an inference of legal motivation, the reason cannot be
legitimate.
Such analysis is supported by sound policy. Since a plaintiff's prima
facie showing creates a relatively weak inference of illegal motivation, it
would improperly tip the delicate evidentiary balance to require the de-
fendant to come forward with reasons that are absolutely necessary for its
continued operation. On the other hand, the burden on the defendant to
create a factual issue should not be so meaningless that it deteriorates
into a pleading fiction. It will be a rare defendant who cannot dredge up
some reason for acting as it did. If the reason is not scrutinized to deter-
mine whether it has sufficient rationality to carry an inference of legal
motivation, the delicate balance will be tipped dramatically in favor of
the defendants. The plaintiff will be prematurely deprived of the infer-
ence of illegal discrimination drawn from his prima facie case.
Until legitimacy is defined as business legitimacy, trial courts may com-
mit serious analytical errors. In many nonjury cases, the error might not
be fatal to sound results. If a defendant articulates a reason that is totally
unreasonable, regardless of the court's conception of 'legitimacy,' the
court probably will conclude that an arbitrary reason is unworthy of be-
866 [Vol. 36
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lief and, therefore, must be pretextual ' The court will award judgment
to the plaintiff. In such cases the failure of the court to define legitimacy
will not affect the proper result. The situation might arise, however, in
which, notwithstanding the irrationality of the articulated reason, the
trial judge still might not be convinced that the defendant was illegally
motivated. If the court has a view that the articulation of any reason
shifts the burden of persuasion on the issue of motive to the plaintiff, the
defendant inevitably and improperly will prevail. The error will be the
result of the court's failure to define 'legitimacy' in terms of the reason's
inference-bearing capacity.' 8 If the reason articulated by the defendant is
incapable of supporting an inference of legal motivation, the plaintiff's
prima facie case has not been placed in issue. Because the defendant has
failed to come forward with evidence that will 'meet and refute' the plain-
tiff's evidence of illegal motivation, the inquiry must end at this point,
and the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. It would be
improper to place a burden of persuasion on the plaintiff.
In jury trials'8 the proper definition of 'legitimacy' is a necessity. First,
in every case juries must have some instruction on the evidentiary signifi-
cance of the articulated reasons. Presumably, the evidentiary strength of
the reason will increase with the level of the reason's specificity and its
rationality. Second, and of primary importance, if the defendant fails to
articulate a reason that is capable of carrying an inference of legal moti-
vation, it will be improper for the court to submit the factual issue of
motivation to the jury. When the plaintiff's prima facie case is unchal-
lenged by a counter-inference, the court must direct a verdict for the
plaintiff.
47. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 53 U.S.L.W. 4314 (Mar. 19, 1985).
48. A court that fails to properly analyze the evidence, however, could reason as fol-
lows: I believe that the reason articulated by the defendant is outrageous and unbelievable.
However, the plaintiff has failed to convince me that, notwithstanding the arbitrary reason
articulated by the defendant, that the defendant was actually motivated by factors made
illegal by the statute. As the plaintiff has failed to carry her burden of persuasion, judgment
must be for the defendant. Such a conclusion would be wholly improper in that it places too
little of an evidentiary burden on the defendant and consequently too great a burden on the
plaintiff. The appeals court could review the reason for its legal sufficiency. See Player,
supra note 36, at 32-37.
49. Juries are not used in 'pure' Title VII cases. See Shah v. Mt. Zion Hosp. & Medical
Center, 642 F.2d 268, 272 (9th Cir. 1981). 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982), however, authorizes pri-
vate employment discrimination suits based on a union or employer's racial discrimination.
See Claiborne v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 583 F.2d 143, 146-47 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 934 (1979). For prayers of legal relief, jury trials are granted under this statute. See
Harris v. Richards Mfg. Co., 675 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1982); Setser v. Novack Inv. Co., 638
F.2d 1137, 1139-40 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064 (1981). The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act specifically grants trial by jury. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2) (1982).
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B. The First Boundary-Legality: The Threshold of Legitimacy
The Court in McDonnell Douglas held that defendant's burden to re-
fute an inference of discriminatory motive required it to articulate a rea-
son that was both 'legitimate' and 'nondiscriminatory.' The very terms
'legitimate' and 'nondiscriminatory' presupposed that the reason relied
upon by defendant was legal.' 0 Clearly, the reason articulated would not
be legally sufficient if it violates Title VII. For example, if a plaintiff al-
leged in her original charge to the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC) that she was a victim of race discrimination, the em-
ployer could not carry its burden of going forward, that is, of articulating
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, by offering proof that it had dis-
criminated against the plaintiff not because of her race, but because of
her sex. To allow such an illegal and discriminatory 'reason' to carry the
defendant's burden would frustrate the enforcement of the Act.' 1 A ra-
tional interpretation of the statute will not allow the defendant to defend
one allegation of illegality by proving that it violated another section of
the same statute.
The employer, however, might be tempted to assert that its treatment
of the plaintiff was not because of race, sex, national origin, or religion,
but because of the employee's union activity (a violation of the National
Labor Relations Act)," because of the plaintiff's age (a violation of the
ADEA)," because the plaintiff had a physical or mental handicap (a vio-
lation of the Rehabilitation Act)," or because the employee complained
50. WEsSTzR's THwD NEw INT'L DICTIONARY 1291 (Unabridged, 1967). "Legitimate"...
"Accordant with law or with established legal forms and requirements." Id. The Court in
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 362 (1977), addressing de-
fendant's burden in a 'pattern or practice' suit, held that the employer must demonstrate
that the individual applicant was denied an employment opportunity for lawful reasons.
51. cf. Lyford v. Schilling, 750 F.2d 1341, 1345 (5th Cir. 1985). The judicial complaint
can only cover allegations made in a charge initially filed with the EEOC. Thus, if the
charge alleged race discrimination, a plaintiff may not be allowed to litigate and secure a
remedy for sex discrimination. See Shah v. Mt. Zion Hosp. & Medical Center, 642 F.2d 268,
271-72 (9th Cir. 1981); Beamon v. W.B. Saunders Co., 413 F. Supp. 1167, 1173-76 (E.D. Pa.
1970). The relatively short time limitation for filing a charge with the EEOC (180 days in a
nondeferral state, 300 days in a jurisdiction with an EEO statute (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)
(1982)), would time-bar any new charge filed with the EEOC alleging the admitted sex dis-
crimination. Thus, a plaintiff might be unable to secure relief for an admitted violation of
the statute.
52. The relevant portion of 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982) states: "It shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer-by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment
or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization." Id.
53. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982).
54. 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (1982) requires federal agencies that have contracts with suppliers
of goods and services to include in those contracts a clause obligating the contractor to
[Vol. 36
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about a safety violation (a possible violation of the Occupational Safety
and Health Act)." An employer may argue that since Title VII only pros-
cribes discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,
if the defendant used factors not forbidden by Title VII, even if those
factors are illegal under other statutes, the court is powerless in a Title
VII proceeding to order a remedy."
Should this argument be accepted, a defendant, at the very least, may
postpone liability, a policy not to be encouraged. More significantly, how-
ever, inconsistent statutes of limitation, 7 lack of private enforcement
power in other statutes,ss and the spectre of inconsistent verdicts" may
"take affirmative action to employ and advance in employment qualified handicapped indi-
viduals .... The United States Department of Labor, which is charged with enforcing this
provision, has implemented regulations proscribing discrimination." Id. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-
741 (1983). 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982) provides that "no otherwise qualified handicapped indi-
vidual... shall, solely by reason of his handicap ... be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Id.
55. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982). See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 8-13
(1980).
56. The employer could also argue that it would involve the court in collateral issues if it
had to resolve whether or not the other, noncharged statutes were actually violated by de-
fendant. See Smith Employment Defenses in Employment Discrimination in Litiga-
tion: A Reassessment of Burdens of Proof and Substantive Standards (following Texas
Dep't of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine), 55 TEMPLE L.Q. 372, 372 (1982).
57. The NLRA requires charges to be filed with the National Labor Relations Board
within six months from the unfair labor practice, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982). Under the
ADEA the plaintiff, in addition to filing a timely charge with the EEOC, must file a suit
within two years from the date of the alleged discrimination. 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (1982). Title
VII adopts an entirely different system of time limitations. As long as a timely charge is
filed with the EEOC there is no statutory time in which suits by the EEOC must be filed.
Subject only to the equitable doctrine of laches, the EEOC may file a Title VII suit at any
time. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 360-73 (1977). Title VII
also allows the individual to file a private action. Following a timely charge with the EEOC
the charging party is entitled to await the outcome of the EEOC conciliation effort. These
efforts may take years. Only after the EEOC has indicated that concilation efforts have
failed and has granted to the charging party the 'right to sue' does the statute impose a time
limitation on the plaintiff. Suit must then be filed within ninety days from the receipt of the
'notice of the right to suit.' See Kirk v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 578 F.2d 814, 817-20 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1004 (1978). Obviously, by the time Title VII litigation has been com-
pleted, the time limitations for filing actions under other statutes such as the NLRA or the
ADEA may have lapsed. It is unlikely that the filing of a Title VII charge will toll the
running of these other statutory time periods. See International Union of Elec. Radio &
Machine Workers Local 790 v. Robbins & Myers, 429 U.S. 229, 236-40 (1976); Johnson v.
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 462-67 (1975).
58. There is no private enforcement of rights created by § 503 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, amended by 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976). See Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., Inc., 629
F.2d 1226, 1237-44 (7th Cir. 1980); Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1078 (5th Cir.
1980). Similarly, complaints under the NLRA and OSHA are filed administratively with the
enforcing agency, and only the enforcing agency has power to invoke the statutory enforce-
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make it possible for an employer to avoid liability under any statute.
Such a result patently undercuts public policy. Furthermore, the logic of
the defendant's position is based upon the premise that each of the em-
ployment statutes is a pocket of legislation totally independent of other
statutes. Such a view, however, is unduly myopic. These acts constitute a
body of law that should be interpreted as an interrelated whole, securing
ment mechanisms. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967) (NLRA General Counsel has
unreviewable discretion to refuse to institute an unfair labr practice complaint); Taylor v.
Brighton Corp., 616 F.2d 256, 259 (6th Cir. 1980) (Secretary of Labor has exclusive enforce-
ment power under OSHA). Thus, if a defendant in a Title VII action is permitted to rely on
a reason that is potentially a violation of the NLRA, the Rehabilitation Act, or OSHA an
employee seeking relief under these statutes might not secure an adjudication because the
agency charged with exclusive enforcement powers might fail or refuse to institute proceed-
ings. (This possibility prompted the Court in Vaca to retain the private right of action to
enforce the 'duty of fair representation' even though the Labor Board has assumed jurisdic-
tion over such charges.)
59. For example, if the employer successfully defends the Title VII charge by arguing
that it was anti-union bias that motivated the discharge, when charged before the Labor
Board with a violation of the NLRA, the employer might deny anti-union bias and assert
that it was the age of the plaintiff that caused the discharge. Although it might be asserted
that concepts of collateral estoppel should bind the employer to the findings in the Title VII
litigation, these concepts probably are not applicable between courts and administrative
agencies enforcing different statutory schemes. See 2 K DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREA-
TISE §§ 18.04, .11 (1958 ed. & 1982 Supp.). Issues litigated under state fair employment
statutes may have a res judicata effect on identical issues arising under Title VII. See
Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1982). When similar issues are
presented under different statutes, however, the courts uniformly have denied collateral es-
toppel effect For example, in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1974),
the Court refused to find that a prior contract arbitration award was binding in Title VII
litigation. A judicial evaluation of contract issues would not bind the Labor Board in subse-
quent adjudication of the same issue under the NLRA. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 681-83 (1951). See generally In re South Atl. S.S. Co., 12
N.L.R.B. Dec. (CCH) 1367, 1370-80 (1939). Conversely, an NLRB adjudication will not bind
the courts even in regard to identical issues arising under the NLRA. International Union of
Operating Eng'rs Local 714 v. Sullivan Transfer, Inc., 650 F.2d 669, 675-76 (5th Cir. 1981).
Concerning issues arising first under the NLRA that are later presented to courts in Title
VII litigation, the courts have held that Labor Board adjudication of nondiscrimination is
not binding in regard to Title VII issues. Peters v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 483 F.2d 490, 497
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1002 (1973); Tipler v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 443
F.2d 125, 128-30 (6th Cir. 1971).
Furthermore, the court in its Title VII judgment might not make a positive finding that it
was 'age' or 'unionism' that motivated the employer. The court is more likely to enter a
negative finding, holding simply that it was not race, sex, national origin, or religion that
motivated the employer's action. Absent a positive finding by the trial court that it was 'age'
or 'unionism,' or a 'handicap,' collateral estoppel could not be invoked. Of course, the official
admission or other finding might be used in the subsequent litigation and would often have
considerable, although not conclusive, persuasive effect. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974).
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for employees a broad charter of employment protections." It is true that
the numerous statutes were enacted at different times to remedy particu-
lar problems, and that procedurally they have been considered indepen-
dent of each other. Nonetheless, substantively they are bound together by
a common theme, which is to protect employees in their employment re-
lationship from a wide range of employer discrimination. Each statute
adds one or more pieces to the mosaic, but the pattern they form is clear;
federal law provides a code of employee rights. This code must be inter-
preted in a manner that serves the underlying spirit of employee protec-
tion in the work place. Congress could not have intended that the rights
it specifically granted to employees would be frustrated by an interpreta-
tion that allows an employer to play one statute against another in a way
that effectively denies employees all protection of law."
When this view of the statutory scheme is taken, the broad doctrine of
estoppel may be invoked to protect that policy by requiring that a defen-
dant be estopped from asserting its own act of illegality as a basis for
avoiding liability. The defendant should not be allowed to avoid the law's
commands by proving that it acted illegally.es
Finally, the basic premise of the decision in McDonnell Douglas, rein-
forced by the decision in Furnco, was that the defendant, to meet its bur-
60. See County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 178-80 (1981); Loeb v. Textron,
Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1010 (1st Cir. 1979); Schultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 266
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970).
61. The Court has demanded a very expansive interpretation of Title VII rights to en-
sure that the underlying purposes of the legislation are not frustrated. See United Steel-
workers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979), in which the Court invoked the 'spirit' of
the statute to hold that a voluntary affirmative action hiring program that utilized racial
criteria was not 'race' discrimination. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971),
the Court relied on the purposes of Title VII to conclude that neutral distinctions imposed
without discriminatory intent could still violate the statute if they had an adverse impact on
a protected class. See also City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435
U.S. 702, 710-12 (1978). The legislative history of Title VII indicates a desire of Congress to
retain and have interpreted in a compatible fashion the various statutory protections for
employee rights. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-14, -17 (1976 & Supp. 1981). See generally debates
surrounding the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982). See
118 CONG. REc. 1387-98, 3371-73 (1972). See also United States v. New Orleans Pub. Serv.,
Inc., 553 F.2d 459, 466-68 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated, 436 U.S. 942 (1978). The legislative his-
tory of the ADEA likewise indicates a desire that the statutes be interpreted in a consistent,
compatible fashion. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 583-85 (1978); Loeb v. Textron,
Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1015-16 (1st Cir. 1979).
62. Brinkman v. Dorsey Motors, Inc., 121 N.J.L. 115, 1 A.2d 473, 475 (1938); Chicago St.
Paul P.M. & O.R. Ry. v. Douglas County, 134 Wis. 197, 114 N.W. 511, 514 (1908). Title VII
invokes the 'equitable' jurisdiction of the courts. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976 & Supp.
1981). See also Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 392-93 (1982); Pearson v. West-
ern Elec. Co., 542 F.2d 1150, 1152-53 (10th Cir. 1976) (courts should liberally utilize tradi-
tional equitable doctrines).
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den, must create an inference of legal motivation sufficient to counter the
plaintiff's prima facie case. The defendant can create such an inference
only by articulating legal reasons. A court should not infer that one illegal
reason motivated the defendant's action rather than the Title VII illegal-
ity inferred from the plaintiff's prima facie case.
A recent Ninth Circuit case" illustrates, and by inference supports, the
conclusion that illegal reasons cannot be 'legitimate.' In Thorn v. City of
El Segundo," a qualified female was denied a position as a police officer.
One articulated reason for her rejection was her involvement in a past
sexual affair. The court found that inquiries into the applicant's private
sex life that were used to deny her state employment violated her rights
of association and privacy under the fourteenth amendment.61 Thus, one
of the reasons the employer used to justify its rejection of plaintiff was
illegal. The court addressed the Title VII claim of sex discrimination and
found that the use of plaintiff's sexual history was pretextual because
similar standards were not applied to male applicants.as It is worthy of
note, however, that the reason itself was not deemed legally sufficient,
presumably, at least in part, because of its illegality. Thus, 'legitimacy'
means at least 'legality.'"
C. 'Necessity: The Outer Limit of Legitimacy
The Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.68 held that when selection cri-
teria have an adverse impact on a class protected by the statute, the em-
ployer has the burden of establishing the 'business necessity' of the chal-
lenged criteria." Absent proof of 'necessity' a plaintiff will prevail."0
Although no precise definition of 'necessity' has been formulated by the
63. Thorn v. City of El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1982).
64. 726 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1982).
65. Id. at 471.
66. Id. at 466.
67. See Curlier v. City of Fort Wayne, 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 717 (N.D. Ind.
1984) which held that an articulation of union activity could not be a legitimate reason
sufficient to carry a defendant's burden in a Title VII case.
68. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
69. See id. at 432. See also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
70. The defendant's burden in an adverse impact case is not satisfied by merely articu-
lating or coming forward with a reason; its burden is one of proof, of establishing to the
satisfaction of the court the 'necessity' of the selection criteria. See Walker v. Jefferson
County Home, 726 F.2d 1554, 1558 (11th Cir. 1984); Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, 657 F.2d 750,
752 n.2 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 967 (1982); Contreras v. City of Los Angeles,
656 F.2d 1267, 1275-80 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021 (1982); Kirby v. Colony
Furniture Co., 613 F.2d 696, 703 (8th Cir. 1980).
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Supreme Court," the term is generally agreed to contain three ele-
ments: (1) a strong or substantial employer interest; (2) a close or 'mani-
fest' relationship between the employer purpose and the challenged crite-
ria; and (3) no alternative practice that would have a less discriminatory
effect.72 It is generally agreed that a defendant's burden of proving 'neces-
sity' is relatively difficult.
Disparate treatment cases must be distinguished from situations that
analyze the legality of a device that has an adverse impact on a protected
class. The issues are totally different. That a reason may be strong
enough to justify its use notwithstanding its impact on an entire class
does not control the issue of disparate treatment." In disparate treat-
ment cases the sole, underlying, and ultimate issue is the motivation of a
single action. The concept of 'legitimacy' was created by the courts to
focus the shifting burdens of addressing the motive of the action. Analysis
of the term 'legitimate,' therefore, must focus on its relationship to infer-
ences of motivation. The starting point is the inference of illegal motiva-
tion that flows from a plaintiff's prima facie showing. The prima facie
case is easily created."' As pointed out above, it merely requires the plain-
tiff to prove vacancy, qualification, application, and rejection. The infer-
ence of illegal motive that flows from such a showing is far from compel-
ling, and can be countered by a similarly weak inference of proper
motivation. The term 'legitimate' must be defined in this context. An in-
ference of proper motivation that is sufficiently strong to refute the infer-
ence of improper motivation flowing from a prima facie showing can be
71. See supra note 6.
72. "An overriding legitimate business purpose ... sufficiently compelling to override
any racial impact.., effectively carry out the business purpose it is alleged to serve," and
the presence of "no acceptable alternative policies or practices which would better accom-
plish the business purpose advanced, or accomplish it equally well with a lesser differential
racial impact." Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971). See also
Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686, 691-92 (8th Cir. 1983); Williams v.
Colorado Springs School Dist. No. 11, 641 F.2d 835, 841 (10th Cir. 1981); Contreras v. City
of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1275-80 (9th Cir. 1981); Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523
F.2d 1290, 1297 (8th Cir. 1975). The burden of presenting evidence of a lesser discrimina-
tory alternative was placed on plaintiff in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425
(1975). Cf New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979), which suggests that
'job relatedness' is the sole basis of 'necessity.'
73. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579 (1978); International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977); Furnish, A Path Through the
Maze: Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment Under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 After Beazer and Burdine, 23 B.C. L. Rv. 419 (1982).
74. "The burden of establishing a prima facie case is not onerous .... The prima facie
case serves an important function in the litigation; it eliminates the most common nondis-
criminatory reasons for the plaintiff's rejection." Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Bur-
dine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1981). See also International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977).
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far short of proof that the reason was 'necessary' to the safe and efficient
operation of the employer's business. To be 'legitimate' the reason need
only be a rational explanation for the employer's action. It can be legiti-
mate even if the employer's goals, interests, or concerns were less than
compelling, and even if the relationship between the reason and the em-
ployer's goals and concerns is less than close, manifest, or proximate.
The decision in McDonnell Douglas confirmed this result. A former
black employee was denied re-employment.7 5 The employer stated that
the denial was because of plaintiff's participation in an illegal 'stall-in'
civil rights demonstration conducted on the employer's premises.76 Rely-
ing on Griggs, the court of appeals applied a standard of 'business neces-
sity' and demanded proof of actual work relatedness. Because defendant
could not establish the 'necessity' or 'work relatedness' of the reason for
not rehiring plaintiff, plaintiff's prima facie case of racial discrimination
was said by the court of appeals to be unrefuted.77 The Supreme Court
unanimously reversed, holding that the 'necessity' burden placed on de-
fendant was too great.78 The Court held that defendant's burden was only
to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.79 Without further
elaboration the Court concluded that, as a matter of law, the employer's
reason was legitimate since it could refuse to "rehire one who has engaged
in such deliberate, unlawful activity against it." 0 The case was remanded
to the trial court to take evidence on whether the reason proffered by
defendant was a pretext to cover a racially discriminatory motive.
Two conclusions can be drawn from this result. First, to be legitimate
the reason need not rise to the level of 'business necessity.' The court of
appeals' application of the 'business necessity' standard, drawn from
Griggs was expressly rejected.81 Second, the reason can be legitimate even
75. 411 U.S. at 796.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 797-98.
78. Id. at 802.
79. Id. at 803.
80. Id. at 804.
81. Id. at 805-06. The difference between the business rationality that will suffice to
carry a defendant's burden in a disparate treatment case, and the business necessity re-
quired in an adverse impact case is illustrated by an example of an employer who utilizes
past criminal conviction records as a selection device. If the employer utilizes a 'no-convic-
tion' rule as a blanket disqualification, the adverse impact of the rule on minorities will
require the employer to justify the application of the rule in terms of business necessity. In
jobs not requiring a high level of trust or honesty, it will be difficult for the defendant to
carry the burden of proving that the rule is 'necessary.' See Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523
F.2d 1290, 1297 (8th Cir. 1975). Cf. Richardson v. Hotel Corp. of Am., 332 F. Supp. 519
(E.D. La. 1971), affd, 468 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1972). In making individual hiring decisions,
however, the employer may utilize the existence or nonexistence of a criminal record in
deciding which competing applicants to employ. The reason of 'no-criminal record' can be
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if not directly related to the applicant's actual or projected ability to per-
form job duties. It was this lack of 'job relatedness' that particularly
prompted the court of appeals to rule in favor of plaintiff. By its reversal
the Supreme Court necessarily established that a reason may be legiti-
mate even if not proved to be directly related to actual or projected job
performance.
In Furnco, the court of appeals held that if the employer could have
used available alternative devices that would have produced similar or
better employment results without the same foreseeable class-wide im-
pact on women or minority applicants, this could suggest that the reason
used to reject the plaintiff was 'discriminatory.'8 ' The Court rejected this
argument and held that possible impact on a protected class will not
make a reason 'discriminatory,' nor will the existence of 'better' devices or
'lesser discriminatory alternatives' undercut the legitimacy of the
reason.
as
In Furnco, defendant gave as its reason for not employing plaintiffs
that they were 'walk-on' applicants, unknown to the job superintendent.
Defendant had a rule against hiring such applicants." That rule was the
'reason' for plaintiff's rejection."s The court of appeals held that defen-
dant failed to establish the legitimacy of the reason because rather than
simply rejecting those who were unknown to the job superintendent, de-
fendant could have better served its goal of securing the most qualified
workers by taking written applications and evaluating the relative qualifi-
cations of each applicant." Furthermore, the court of appeals believed
that such a system of taking applications would have had a less discrimi-
natory impact on minority employment opportunities. In addition, the
presence of a better employment system that would have increased the
number of minority employees kept the 'no walk-on' reason from being
sufficiently rational to be 'legitimate.' See Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 549 F.2d 1158, 1161
(8th Cir. 1977). Similarly, use of an educational requirement may not be 'necessary' because
it lacks a close relationship to job performance. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32. The use, how-
ever, of relative education as the factor in selecting between two competing employees will
be sufficiently rational to be 'legitimate.' Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 697 F.2d 810,
815-16 (8th Cir. 1983). Although a nonvalidated test will not be 'necessary' for efficiency,
see, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425-30 (1975), using a test score to
reject a single applicant may be legitimate. Herd v. County of Allegheny, 30 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 112, 118 (W.D. Pa. 1979). See also separate opinions of Justices Marshall
and Brennan in Furnco, 438 U.S. at 581. Cf. also the majority and dissenting opinions in
Strecker v. Grand Forks County Social Serv. Bd., 640 F.2d 96, 100 (Sth Cir. 1981) (overruled
by Robino v. Norton, 682 F.2d 192 (8th Cir. 1982)).
82. 438 U.S. at 576.
83. Id. at 576-77.
84. Id. at 570.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 573-74.
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legitimate.67
The Supreme Court reversed.es First, the Court was critical of any at-
tempt by courts to evaluate the relative quality of employee selection
methods. The Court said, "Courts are generally less competent than em-
ployers to restructure business practices, and unless mandated to do so
by Congress they should not attempt it."s The Court then stated:
[Tihe burden which shifts to the employer is merely that of proving that
he based his employment decision on a legitimate consideration .... To
prove that, he need not prove that he pursued the course which would
both enable him to achieve his own business goal and allow him to con-
sider the most employment applicants. Title VII ... does not impose a
duty to adopt a hiring procedure that maximizes hiring of minority
employees."
The decision in Furnco teaches that the legitimacy of a reason is not
dependent upon the reason being the 'best' method for employer action;
furthermore, the existence of alternative methods of selection that would
not have a similar foreseeable impact on minority employment does not
deprive the reason of its legitimacy. The Court did not totally discount
the relevance of such factors, but indicated that their relevance goes not
to legitimacy but to pretext; they are simply some evidence of the em-
ployer's improper motivation9s
The Court in Furnco was correct in holding that after the defendant
makes a showing of the existence and apparent legitimacy of a reason, he
has satisfied his immediate burden. The decision is subject to criticism,
however, because it failed to identify the nature of the plaintiff's reshifted
burden, and because it commingled two distinct concepts that should re-
main distinct-legitimacy and pretext.'2
87. Id.
88. Id. at 581.
89. Id. at 588.
90. Id. at 577-78 (emphasis in the original).
91. Id. at 578. ,
92. The other shortcoming in the Furnco analysis was the Court's holding that an em-
ployer need not use reasons that serve its purposes equally well but with less of a foresee-
able impact on minority applicants. This holding runs counter to the well-established evi-
dentiary principle that an employer is presumed to intend the natural and foreseeable
consequences of its actions. Radio Officers v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 45 (1954). If an employer
has two methods that serve its employment goals equally well, and method A has a foresee-
able impact on minority opportunities while method B has no such foreseeable impact, then
when the employer selects method A (the more discriminatory method), we must presume
that the employer intended those foreseeable consequences. The employer, who is presuma-
bly rational, must have selected method A because of the impact on the minority group.
Thus, if the plaintiff counters the defendant's articulated reason by establishing the pres-
ence of an obviously less discriminatory alternative, this should deprive an initially and
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D. Narrowing the Extremes: More than Arbitrariness, Less than Ne-
cessity. Result: Legitimacy Equals 'Business Rationality.'
To be 'legitimate' a reason must not violate positive law. On the other
hand, a reason is not deprived of its legitimacy merely because it is not
necessary. A wide range exists between legality and necessity. It can be
argued that the term 'legitimate' on its face means no more than that the
reason is not prohibited by law. The term 'legitimate' does not suggest
any level of rationality. It must be remembered, however, that the ulti-
mate issue in disparate treatment cases is a defendant's motivation. After
a plaintiff has established an inference of illegal motivation, the defen-
dant's burden is to 'meet and refute' that inference by creating a counter-
inference of legal motivation. Consequently, the defendant's articulated
reason must be examined to determine whether it can be inferred from
the existence of the reason that the employer was properly motivated.
A reason cannot be legitimate if it fails to carry a defendant's eviden-
tiary burden. If the reason articulated by the defendant allows an infer-
ence of proper motivation to be drawn, and that inference is sufficiently
strong to refute a plaintiff's inference of illegal motivation, the reason can
be said to be legitimate. 9" But if the reason articulated does not permit an
inference of proper motivation to be drawn, or if drawn, the inference is
so anemic that it does not effectively refute the plaintiff's inference, it
must be concluded that the reason lacks 'legitimacy.' 'Legitimacy,' there-
fore, is a legal term of art, not to be defined in absolute terms of legality.
It is a flexible term that must be judged in light of permissible motiva-
tional inferences.
Arbitrary or idiosyncratic reasons are not 'legitimate' because they fail
to carry an inference of legal motivation. As rational beings, employers
more often than not will use reasons that have some legitimate relation-
ship to bona fide business concerns. It, therefore, cannot be inferred with
any strength that an employer was motivated by a proffered reason that
is bizarre, irrational, or wholly arbitrary."
If an employer actually makes a decision based on the fact that the
facially rational reason of its probative evidentiary value. Upon the plaintiff's proof, the
absence of illegal motivation can no longer be inferred from the reason's existence.
93. See United States Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983), in which the
Court looked to plaintiff's evidence of illegal motivation and defendant's articulated reason
to conclude that a factual issue of motivation was presented.
94. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The requirement of actual reasons, as op-
posed to averments of good faith, was confirmed by the Court in subsequent litigation, par-
ticularly in Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 (1981). Accord
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 342 n.23 (1977); Alexander
v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972); White v. Vathally, 732 F.2d 1037, 1042 (1st Cir.
1984); Baylor v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 733 F.2d 1527, 1533 (11th Cir. 1984).
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applicant is left-handed, or green-eyed, or is a democrat, regardless of the
irrationality of the reason, the employer will not be engaging in discrimi-
nation proscribed by the statute. Left-handedness, or green-eyedness, or
political preference are not protected by the statute. The issue, however,
is not whether arbitrary factors are proscribed by the Act. Absent a prima
facie showing of illegally-motivated discrimination.the employer is free to
use such devices. In the face of a prima facie case creating an inference of
race, sex, or national origin discrimination, a defendant is obligated to
articulate legitimate reasons from which proper motivation can be in-
ferred. Some reasons (such as left-handedness or green-eyedness) are so
weak that they will not allow a reasonable inference to be drawn that
these reasons, rather than the statutorily prescribed reasons already in-
ferred, actually motivated the employer. Proper motivation can be in-
ferred only from reasons that a reasonable business person would employ
under similar circumstances. If the reasons advanced by the defendant
would not be used by a reasonable or rational businessperson similarly
situated, it cannot be inferred with any strength that such proffered rea-
sons, in fact, motivated the decision. Articulation of an arbitrary reason,
thus, leaves the plaintiff's inference of illegal motivation unrefuted.
In McDonnell Douglas, the Court expressly required a 'reason,' indicat-
ing that mere denial of illegal motivation would not suffice.9 An arbitrary
reason, however, is factually tantamount to a mere denial, since any em-
ployer could couple its denial with some reason. If any reason suffices to
carry the burden assigned to a defendant, the burden becomes a meaning-
less shell, a fiction. The Court in McDonnell Douglas said that the reason
must be 'legitimate.'" 6 Legitimacy surely presupposes some relationship to
usual or reasonable employer purposes.
The Court in McDonnell Douglas was presented with a factual situa-
tion in which there existed a relatively close relationship between em-
ployer interests and the reason articulated for the employment decision.
Plaintiff, while on the economic lay-off, was convicted of criminal trespass
against the property of the employer. Plaintiff's activity was the culmina-
tion of a dispute with the employer over the employer's employment
practices. The Court said: "Nothing in Title VII compels an employer to
absolve and rehire one who has engaged in such deliberate, unlawful ac-
tivity against it.' 97 Although the Court rejected the argument that defen-
dant may only use reasons that are directly related to job performance,
the Court made it clear that defendant's reason was sufficient to carry its
burden because defendant was acting nonarbitrarily within usual or ex-
95. 411 U.S. at 802.
96. Id. at 803.
97. Id. at 805-06.
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pected employer concerns.
The idea that a reason, to be legitimate, must have some rational nexus
to bona fide employer interest finds confirmation in the language of the
decision in Furnco. The Court upheld as legitimate the refusal to hire
plaintiff pursuant to a rule that the employer would not consider 'walk-
on' applicants unknown to the supervisor." The Court held that the re-
fusal to consider unknown applicants for the job of bricklayer was "rea-
sonably related to the achievement of some legitimate goal."" During its
discussion of the relative burdens and the source of inferences, the Court
strongly implied that a reason which appeared 'arbitrary,' particularly in
the 'business setting,' would not refute the inference of racial motivation
that flowed from the prima facie case. 00
The Equal Pay Act' 0' and Title VII must be interpreted in a compati-
ble manner.102 Under the Equal Pay Act, once a plaintiff establishes
equality of work and inequality of pay between workers of the opposite
sex, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the pay difference is
based on a "factor other than sex."'" Courts that have interpreted the
Equal Pay Act uniformly indicate that not any sex-neutral factor will suf-
fice to carry the defendant's burden. The Court in Kouba v. Allstate
Ins.,'" said that: "The Equal Pay Act concerns business practices. It
would be nonsensical to sanction the use of a factor that rests on some
consideration unrelated to business. An employer thus cannot use a factor
which causes a wage differential between male and female employees ab-
sent an acceptable business reason."' "
To secure consistency in result, a similar requirement of business ra-
tionality should be imposed upon a defendant in constructing burdens
under Title VII and the ADEA.'" Certainly, the rationale of the Equal
98. 438 U.S. at 570.
99. Id. at 578.
100. Id. at 577.
101. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982).
102. See County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 167-81 (1981); City of Los
Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711-14 (1978). See also the
Bennett Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982), which states that no practice shall be
unlawful under Title VII if it is authorized by the Equal Pay Act. Since the Reorganization
of 1978, the Equal Pay Act, the ADEA, and Title VII are all admiibistered and enforced by
the EEOC. 3 C.F.R. 321 (1979).
103. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(iv) (1976). See Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188,
204-05 (1974).
104. 691 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982).
105. Id. at 876. Accord EEOC v. Aetna Ins. Co., 616 F.2d 719, 724-26 (4th Cir. 1980);
Strecker v. Grand Forks County Social Serv. Bd., 640 F.2d 96, 100 (8th Cir. 1980); Hodgson
v. Behrens Drug Co., 475 F.2d 1041, 1043 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 822 (1973). See
generally 29 C.F.R. §§ 800.143-.151 (1983).
106. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982).
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Pay Act cases appears appropriate; all employment discrimination stat-
utes are concerned with 'business practices.'
Similarly, under the National Labor Relations Act, 7 if a charging
party establishes an inference that an employer's action was intended to
encourage or discourage union membership or activity, the burden that is
shifted to the employer is not met by simply presenting some reason. The
burden is to show a "legitimate and substantial business justification."' 10
The lower courts appear to agree that legitimacy under Title VII re-
quires some relationship to bona fide employer purposes. For example,
the court in Miller v. WLFI Radio, Inc.1° 9 indicated that the employer's
burden was to produce evidence of 'business reasons.' 10 The court in
Green v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co."' allowed the use of criminal con-
victions to make individual employment decisions only if the convictions
had some relationship to the nature of the job to be performed.'" Simi-
larly, the court in United States v. City of Miami"$ approved the use of
lie detector results that had a valid relationship to bona fide employer
concerns.11
4
In summary, a defendant need not prove that the reason articulated for
its treatment of a plaintiff was 'necessary.' The reason's legitimacy is not
even defeated by a showing that the defendant could have used better,
more effective, and less discriminatory methods. Not every reason, how-
ever, will be legally sufficient. The reason must be legal and not so devoid
of rationality that it will not support an inference of legal motivation. A
reason will be 'legitimate,' therefore, only if it rationally relates to bona
107. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
108. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 380 (1967) (emphasis added). See
also NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1967); American Ship Bldg. Co.
v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 311 (1965).
109. 687 F.2d 136 (6th Cir. 1982).
110. Id. at 138.
111. 549 F.2d 1158 (8th Cir. 1977).
112. Id. at 1160.
113. 614 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1980), modified, 664 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1982).
114. 614 F.2d at 1346. Accord Carmichael v. Birmingham Seaworks, 738 F.2d 1126 (11th
Cir. 1984); Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1983); see EEOC v. Spokane
Concrete Prod., Inc., 534 F. Supp. 518, 523 (E.D. Wash. 1982); Furnish, supra note 72, at
437. See also Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910, 927-28 (3d Cir. 1983) (Adams,
J., dissenting). Judge Adams argued that it was reversible error for a trial court to exclude
evidence that the manager of a university bookstore favored her niece over plaintiff because'
of the family relationship. Judge Adams argued that if nepotism was the reason for not
selecting plaintiff, the articulated reason of relative qualifications was pretextual. Further-
more, Judge Adams argued that the nepotism practice itself would not be a legitimate rea-
son and would not carry defendant's burden. See Bonilla v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 697
F.2d 1297, 1302-03 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3533 (1984), suggesting the ille-
gitimacy of using nepotism practices to make compensation and work assignment distinc-
tions. Cf. Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1011-12 (lst Cir. 1979).
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fide employer business concerns. In a phrase, to be legitimate, the reason
must have business rationality.
III. 'LEGITIMACY' APPLIED: REFINING THE 'BuSINEss RATIONALITY'
CONCEPr
The list of legal, nonarbitrary reasons that have some relationship to
bona fide employer concerns is infinite. Some examples illustrate the vast
range of legitimacy: Plaintiff rejected prior offers that would have
broadened his experience. 1 5 Plaintiffs were rejected because they were
unknown to the supervisor."" Plaintiff engaged in criminal misconduct on
the employer's premises.17 Personality conflicts and strained relation-
ships caused the denial of a promotion and eventual discharge. 18 The
person selected had a superior education."1 The range of experiences and
demonstrated abilities of the person selected were superior to those of the
plaintiff.120 Plaintiff was overqualified for the position.2 ' Plaintiff had
skills that could not be spared from his present assignment. 2 2 Plaintiff
married a coworker. 23 Plaintiff was involved in a fight with a co-
worker,"' or a customer.2 5 Plaintiff carried a tear-gas pistol to work.'
2 0
Plaintiff was allegedly involved in an off-duty assault."' Plaintiff falsely
reported ill."28 Plaintiff lacked proficiency in the English language. 129 The
person selected was more 'articulate' than was plaintiff.3 0 Plaintiff pro-
115. United States Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983).
116. Furnco, 438 U.S. at 570.
117. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 794-96.
118. Ackerman v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 670 F.2d 66, 70 (6th Cir. 1982); Texas Dep't
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 251 (1981).
119. Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 697 F.2d 810, 813 (8th Cir. 1983).
120. Casillas v. United States Navy, 735 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1984); Verniero v. Air Force
Academy School Dist. No. 20, 705 F.2d 388, 390 (10th Cir. 1983); Valentino v. United States
Postal Serv., 674 F.2d 56, 63 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
121. Canham v. Oberlin College, 666 F.2d 1057, 1060 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 977 (1982).
122. Sweeney v. Research Found., 711 F.2d 1179, 1185-86 (2d Cir. 1983).
123. Harper v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 525 F.2d 409, 410 (8th Cir. 1975).
124. Green v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 612 F.2d 967 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
879 (1980).
125. Hunn v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 31 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 33,522 (D. Colo.
1983).
126. Jones v. Lumberjack Meats, Inc., 680 F.2d 98, 100 (11th Cir. 1982).
127. Garner v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 676 F.2d 1223, 1225 (8th Cir. 1982); Trapp v. State
Univ. College at Buffalo, 31 EPD (CCH) 1 33,475 (W.D. N.Y. 1983).
128. McNeil v. Greyhound Lines, 31 Emp. Proc. Dec. (CCH) 1 33, 483 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
129. Tran v. City of Houston, 31 Emp. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 33,412 (S.D. Tex. 1983).
130. Smithers v. Bailar, 629 F.2d 892, 894 (3d Cir. 1980).
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vided false information on his job application.'3 ' Plaintiff was discharged
for excessive absenteeism,"' or for violation of work rules. 33 Plaintiff had
a physical infirmity that prohibited lifting.' Each of these reasons is le-
gitimate because we can infer from the reason's existence that the em-
ployer was properly motivated.
Certain ostensibly reasonable factors, however, have been held to lack
'legitimacy.' For example, in a suit charging age discrimination, the rea-
son that the person selected had more 'potential' than plaintiff is not a
legitimate reason.'35 Similarly, reasons such as 'one line of work too long,'
or not 'current in knowledge,' or 'too many years since college' will not be
legitimate.'" If an employer lays off older employees and uses the reason
that the persons retained have less seniority, the reason is not legiti-
mate.137 What makes these reasons illegitimate is that each reason di-
rectly translates into time, and time translates into age. Thus, each fac-
tor, although appearing to be legitimate, lacks legitimacy because it is
inherently and unavoidable discriminatory on the basis of the proscribed
criteria.'"
A female applicant may be rejected in favor of a male. The reason given
may be that the male applicant 'appeared to have greater strength.' Al-
though 'appearance of strength' may seem to be legitimate, one court has
indicated otherwise.'" The reason was that a subjective evaluation was
inherently and unavoidably discriminatory against women. The same can
be said of using relative height or weight in selecting a male over a fe-
male.140 If a black is rejected in favor of a white, and the reason given is
that the white was the personnel director's brother-in-law, this will seem
to lack legitimacy if the employer is predominantly white. Past patterns
of exclusion and segregation will necessarily and unavoidably make such a
131. Avant v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 716 F.2d 1083, 1085 (5th Cir. 1983).
132. Kenyatta v. Bookey Packing Co., 649 F.2d 552, 553 (8th Cir. 1981).
133. Kellin v. ACF Indus., 460 F. Supp. 952, 954 (E.D. Mo. 1978), aff'd in relevant part,
629 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1980).
134. Daubert v. United States Postal Serv., 733 F.2d 1367, 1369 (10th Cir. 1984).
135. Pirone v. Home Ins. Co., 507 F. Supp. 1281, 1289 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
136. See Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 649 F.2d 1383, 1387-90 (10th Cir. 1981); Kerwood v.
Mortgage Bankers Ass'n of Am., 494 F. Supp. 1298 (D.D.C. 1980).
137. Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686, 690-92 (8th Cir. 1983); Geller
v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1033-35 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981).
138. Economic factors, such as that older workers and women require greater employer
costs, are rational; however, since they directly undercut the purposes of the statute they
cannot be considered legitimate. Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 103 S. Ct. 3492, 3495-
97 (1983); EEOC v. City of Altoona, 723 F.2d 4, 6 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
2386 (1984).
139. Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1983).
140. See Mieth v. Dothard, 418 F. Supp. 1169, 1179 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
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reason (nepotism) discriminatory."'
This does not suggest that simply because the reason might be shown
to have an adverse impact on a protected class it loses its legitimacy. The
Court in Furnco clearly rejected this argument. There is a distinction,
however, between totally neutral criteria that may or may not have an
adverse impact, which can only be proved by statistical data, and distinc-
tions that necessarily and unavoidably are discriminatory. A factor that
necessarily perpetuates race, gender, or age patterns cannot be said to be
nondiscriminatory.
Ultimately the analysis depends upon an evaluation of whether it can
be inferred from the existence of the reason that the defendant was prop-
erly motivated. If an older worker is rejected and the reason given is that
he 'lacks potential' or that he has more seniority than the person re-
tained, it cannot be inferred from these reasons that a factor other than
age motivated the decision. An age-related reason does not refute an in-
ference that age was a motivating factor, but instead tends to confirm the
inference of age motivation. Similarly, if a woman is rejected in favor of a
man because she is not as tall, not as heavy, or does not appear to have
strength, can it be said that such a reason will carry an inference that a
factor other than gender motivated the employer's decision? Again, since
the reason does not refute, but rather confirms, sex motivation, the rea-
son lacks legitimacy.
Vague, subjective reasons are suspect and are regularly held to lack le-
gitimacy. 142 When the nature of the job necessarily involves professional
141. See Bonilla v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 697 F.2d 1297, 1302 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 3533 (1984); Walker v. Jefferson County Home, 726 F.2d 1554, 1557-59
(11th Cir. 1984); Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910, 927-28 (3d Cir. 1983) (Ad-
ams, J., dissenting); Beavers v. International Ass'n of Bridge & Structural Ironworkers Local
1, 701 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1983); Local 53, Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047, 1051-53
(5th Cir. 1969).
142. See Harris v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 712 F.2d 1377, 1383 (11th Cir. 1983); Pax-
ton v. Union Nat'l Bank, 688 F.2d 552, 563 n.15 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1083
(1983); Robbins v. White-Wilson Medical Clinic, Inc., 660 F.2d 1064, 1067 (5th Cir. 1981),
vacated on other grounds, 456 U.S. 969 (1982) (rejection of a black applicant for personality
defects described as 'hostile,' 'intimidating,' and 'yucky,' was insufficient to carry defen-
dant's burden of articulating a legitimate reason); Chaline v. KCOH, Inc., 693 F.2d 447, 480-
82 (5th Cir. 1981) (defendant's reason of plaintiff not having the right voice quality was
unduly subjective). See also O'Brien v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 670 F.2d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 1982);
Pittman v. Hattiesburg Mun. Separate School Dist., 644 F.2d 1071, 1075 (5th Cir. 1981); Lee
v. Conecuh County Bd. of Educ., 634 F.2d 959, 963 (5th Cir. 1981), rehearing denied, 640
F.2d 385 (1981); Cross v. United States Postal Serv., 639 F.2d 409, 411-12 (8th Cir. 1981);
Fisher v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 613 F.2d 527, 547 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1115 (1981); Abrams v. Johnson, 534 F.2d 1226, 1230 (6th Cir. 1976); Barnett v. W.T.
Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543, 549-50 (4th Cir. 1975); Rogers v. International Paper Co., 510 F.2d
1340, 1345 (8th Cir. 1975); Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500, 503 (6th Cir. 1974);
United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 380 (8th Cir. 1973); Rowe v. General Motors
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judgments or artistic ability, however, subjective evaluations of perform-
ances have been held to be legitimate.14 Ultimately, the distinction be-
tween subjective reasons that are legitimate, and subjective reasons that
lack legitimacy is the ability of the reason, in the context in which it is
found, to carry an inference of legal motivation. When objectivity readily
could have been utilized to measure employee performance, the articula-
tion of an unnecessarily subjective reason cannot carry an inference that
the subjective reason, rather than impermissible factors, motivated the
employer's action. In situations in which objective measurement and eval-
uation are virtually impossible, however, a subjective conclusion based on
a reasonable and fair evaluation system can carry an inference of legal
motivation. Thus, in order to determine the legitimacy of subjectivity the
question must be asked: Can the reason carry the inference of proper
motivation? If it can, the subjectivity is legitimate. If the subjectivity sug-
gests rather than refutes the inference of illegal motive, however, the sub-
jective conclusion cannot be legitimate.
IV. CONCLUSION
The landmark case of McDonnell Douglas established that once a
prima facie case of disparate treatment has been established by a plain-
tiff, the defendant has a burden to articulate a 'legitimate nondiscrimina-
tory reason' for the particular employment decision. Neither the decision
in McDonnell Douglas nor subsequent decisions of the Court established
a clear definition of the term 'legitimate.' Particular points, however, can
be isolated. A reason, to be legitimate, must be legal. On the other hand,
a reason can be legitimate even though it does not meet the more strin-
gent standard of 'business necessity.'
Between the two extremes of 'legality' and 'necessity' the key to analy-
sis is an appropriate appreciation of motivational inferences. A reason
cannot be 'legitimate' if the reason cannot support an inference of legal
motivation sufficiently strong to 'meet and refute' the plaintiffs prima
facie case. Arbitrary or idiosyncratic reasons are incapable of supporting a
Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 359 (5th Cir. 1972) (alleged 'lack of interest' was inadequate as a matter
of law); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 666 (2d Cir. 1971). See gener-
ally Stacy, Subjective Criteria in Employment Decisions Under Title VII, 10 GA. L. REv.
737 (1976). Cf. Grano v. Department of Dev., 699 F.2d 836 (6th Cir. 1983); Allison v. West-
ern Union Tel. Co., 680 F.2d 1318, 1321 (11th Cir. 1982).
143. E.g., Verniero v. Air Force Academy School Dist. 20, 705 F.2d 388, 391 (10th Cir.
1983) (school principal); Harris v. Group Health Ass'n, 662 F.2d 869, 870-72 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(physicians); Cross v. United States Postal Serv., 639 F.2d 409, 411 (8th Cir. 1981) (supervi-
sors); Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60, 62-63 (2d Cir. 1980) (professors); Frausto v. Legal
Aid Soc'y, 563 F.2d 1324, 1328 (9th Cir. 1977) (attorneys); Nath v. General Elec. Co., 438 F.
Supp. 213, 220 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd, 594 F.2d 855 (3d Cir. 1979) (engineers).
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reasonable inference of legal motivation, and for this reason arbitrariness
cannot be legitimate. To support an inference of legal motivation, the rea-
son must be one that a rational businessperson can be expected to use,
under the circumstances, in making neutrally based, bona fide business
decisions.
The courts should not hastily accept any reason as being legitimate and
proceed to analyze the evidence in terms of pretext. To do so without
carefully analyzing the legitimacy of a defendant's articulated reason
would prematurely shift the burden of persuasion to the plaintiff and,
thus, destabilize the delicate evidentiary balance envisioned by the deci-
sion in McDonnell Douglas.
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